UNDERMINING AND UNINTWINING: THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL AND RULE 12(b)(1)
Stefania A. Di Trolio∗
INTRODUCTION
1

Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
federal district courts have the discretion to decide “jurisdictional
2
facts.” Jurisdictional facts are facts that are alleged and ultimately
3
proven to establish subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.
Although jurisdictional facts are relevant in both § 1331 and § 1332
determinations, the most typical jurisdictional facts involve diversity
of citizenship which gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction
4
under United States Code § 1332. Thus, in a case where jurisdiction
is based upon § 1332, the citizenship of the parties is a jurisdictional
∗
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1
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (“Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter . . . .”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“The
defenses specifically enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether
made in a pleading or by motion . . . shall be heard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination
thereof be deferred until the trial.”).
2
2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30 [1], at 12-36 (3d
ed. 1997).
3
Id.
4
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”); see also § 1332(a) (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . (1) citizens of different
States . . . .”).
Although a jurisdictional prerequisite, the amount in controversy requirement
of § 1332 is generally treated as a merits-related determination because deciding
whether the amount claimed exceeds the $75,000 threshold often requires reaching
the merits of the case. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1350, at 231 (2d ed. 1990); see also infra notes 140-43 and
accompanying text; infra Part IV.
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5

fact. Such a fact is not subject to a jury trial so courts often hold
preliminary hearings to determine if the jurisdictional facts establish
6
jurisdiction.
There is, however, an important exception to Rule 12(b)(1) that
often arises when the jurisdiction is not based upon § 1332, but
7
rather, upon § 1331: courts may not decide jurisdictional facts if
8
such facts are intertwined with the merits of the case. This may seem
like a straightforward proposition, but the exception is more
complicated than might first appear. Although jurisdictional facts
alleging the diversity of citizenship requirement under § 1332 are
easily separated from the merits of the claim, it is often harder to
determine whether facts alleged in federal question cases are purely
9
jurisdictional or intertwined with the merits. Further, the interplay
between the rule and the exception has important implications for
determining who, the court or the finder of fact, decides a number of
10
critical questions under a variety of federal statutes.
A recent example of the complexity of the interplay between the
rule and the exception is the decision by the United States Court of
11
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Scarfo v. Ginsburg, a case with
5

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2001). For example, diversity requires that if one
party is a citizen of New York the other cannot be a citizen of New York. Id.
6
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36.
7
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”); see also 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36 (“Subject matter jurisdiction
in federal-question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a plaintiff’s need
and ability to prove the defendant bound by the federal law asserted as the predicate
for relief—a merits-related determination.”).
While § 1331 is a major source of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is
possible that some statutes have their own specialized jurisdictional grants which may
apply instead of or in addition to § 1331. The analysis of jurisdictional facts and the
“intertwined with merits” exception, however, does not change. See infra notes 14448, 155 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.
8
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 235 (“If, however, a decision of
the jurisdictional issue requires a ruling on the merits of the case, the decision
should await a determination of the merits either by the court on a summary
judgment motion or by the fact finder at trial.”).
9
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36.
10
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2002); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621(2002); Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601(2002); Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2002); Employee Retirement Income Securities Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2002); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29
U.S.C. § 651 (2002); Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2002); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).
11
175 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999).

2003

THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND RULE 12(b)(1)

1249

potentially great implications for both employment discrimination
and § 1331 jurisprudence. In Scarfo, the defendants moved for
summary judgment arguing that there was no federal subject matter
jurisdiction over Scarfo’s Title VII claims because none of the
12
defendants were “employers” as defined by the statutory language.
Scarfo responded that whether the defendants were “employers” as
defined by Title VII was not a purely jurisdictional fact for the court
to decide, but rather, was a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the
13
merits of the case and, thus, was for the jury to decide. In support
14
of her argument, Scarfo cited to Garcia v. Copenhaver, in which the
Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of determining subject
matter jurisdiction, whether a plaintiff was an “employer” or an
“independent contractor” under the ADEA was intertwined with the
15
merits of the plaintiff’s claim. The majority in Scarfo, however, did
not apply the “intertwined with the merits” exception as Garcia had;
instead, it dismissed Scarfo’s claims for lack of subject matter
16
jurisdiction.
Scarfo and Garcia illustrate the courts’ lack of uniformity in
applying the “intertwined with the merits” test. Given the general
17
availability of jury trials under the antidiscrimination statutes, the
threshold question of whether a defendant is an “employer” is often
12

Id. at 959.
Id.
14
104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997).
15
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961 n.1 (citing Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1267).
16
Id. at 961.
Also illustrating the complexities of Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the
merits” exception, the Eleventh Circuit recently decided Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323
F.3d 920, 929-30 (11th Cir. 2003), holding a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal inappropriate
because the question of eligible-employee status “implicated both jurisdiction and
the underlying merits of Appellant’s FMLA claim.” Id. at 930. The court noted that
an intra-circuit split existed on the issue of whether eligible-employee status was
jurisdictional or whether it implicated the merits of the case. Id. at 929 (citing to
Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957 (holding that the issue was jurisdictional) and Garcia v.
Copenhaver, 104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding the issue to be meritsrelated)). Although the court followed the appropriate procedure in such a
situation—the “earliest case rule”—and applied Garcia, the court also stated that it
believed Garcia, and not Scarfo, to “correctly state the law . . . .” Id. at 929.
17
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), first established the right to a jury trial
under the ADEA. Id. It was generally believed that there was no right to a jury trial
under Title VII until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was adopted. See Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974) (stating that “jury trial is not required in an action for
reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (5th
Cir. 1971) (stating that the demand for backpay under Title VII is to be determined
through the exercise of the court’s discretion). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
recognized the right to a jury trial in both Title VII and the ADA cases. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(c), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
13
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18

critical. Whether judge or jury decides the facts in question will
19
frequently determine the outcome of the case. For example, a jury
might be expected to be more sympathetic to the plaintiff on close
20
calls, especially with facts as egregious as those in Scarfo.
This Comment analyzes the application of Rule 12(b)(1) to the
jurisdictional fact question and the appropriateness and limitation of
the “intertwined with the merits” exception. Part I of this Comment
reviews the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Scarfo and sketches its broad
21
implications. Part II then discusses the rule and its exception, with
II.A summarizing the general application of Rule 12(b)(1), II.B.
examining the development of the “intertwined with the merits”
exception, and II.C. analyzing the application of the exception. Part
III of this Comment introduces the right to a jury trial by explaining
the significance of the constitutional right to a jury trial, and
examining that right in the context of Title VII. In addition, Part III
discusses the problems associated with the application of Rule
22
12(b)(1) as they emerge in Scarfo.
Finally, Part IV proposes a
solution which would create uniformity and fairness to plaintiffs in
the application of the “intertwined with the merits” exception. This
solution asks courts to consider whether the fact allegedly
establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction would also apply if the
case were filed in state court.

18

In order to establish a cause of action under the antidiscrimination statutes,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant meets the requisite definition of an
“employer” under the statute. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202
(1997) (noting that hourly and part-time employees count for purposes of
determining whether entity is an “employer” under Title VII); Ost v. West Suburban
Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that independent
contractors do not count for purposes of determining whether entity is an
“employer” under the statute).
This is a fact-sensitive and merits-related
determination that the jury, as the trier of fact, should decide. See infra notes 29-34
and accompanying text.
19
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992) (comparing the outcomes
of jury trials and judge trials).
20
See infra Part I. Compare Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000)
(upholding jury verdict for plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim; the jury, using
the integrated-enterprise test to determine whether two entities could be sued as a
“single-employer” under Title VII, held that parent corporation was plaintiff’s
employer for purposes of the statute), with Scarfo v. Ginsburg, 175 F.3d 957 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because defendant did not meet the requisite definition of
“employer” for purposes of Title VII; case did not get to a jury because the court
summarily decided the issue).
21
See infra Part I.
22
See infra Part III.
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I. SCARFO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
23

As discussed earlier, Scarfo v. Ginsburg is a recent example of the
complex nature of Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the
24
merits” exception.
Victor Ginsburg owned several corporations,
three of which allegedly employed plaintiff Elaine Scarfo as a
25
secretary and receptionist. Scarfo filed a complaint alleging sexual
harassment and employment discrimination against Ginsburg and
26
the three corporations. She alleged that Ginsburg subjected her to
unwanted sexually offensive conduct during the time she was
27
employed and then terminated her after she complained. All of the
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Scarfo’s Title VII claims
because none of the defendants was an employer within the meaning
28
of Title VII.
An employer under Title VII, is “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
29
or preceding calendar year . . . .”
While none of Ginsburg’s
corporations separately employed fifteen or more employees for the
requisite time, Scarfo alleged that “two or more of the above
corporations combined constituted her employer for Title VII
30
purposes.” Even though Title VII permits aggregation of entities to
31
determine coverage, the district court concluded, after an
evidentiary hearing held by the magistrate judge, that the three
32
defendant corporations could not be aggregated. According to the
23

175 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999).
See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-37-12-38 (stating that a Rule 12(b)(1)
dismissal is improper where “the jurisdictional facts are too intertwined with the
merits to permit the determination [of subject matter jurisdiction] to be made
independently [of the merits of the case].”).
25
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958-59.
26
Id. at 959.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).
30
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958-59.
31
See EEOC v. McLemore Food Stores, Inc., No. C-77-2148, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13741, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 1977) (holding that three defendant corporations
were to be regarded as a single employer for purposes of Title VII) (citing Williams v.
New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 341 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. La. 1972) (finding that the single
employer theory that had been applied under the National Labor Relations Act
could be applied in EEOC cases as well), and EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel
Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974) (noting a close relationship between
the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII)).
32
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 959.
24
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district court, one of the corporations was not sufficiently integrated
in its operations with the others for all three to be treated as a single
33
employer.
As a result, the court applied a summary judgment
standard and dismissed Scarfo’s Title VII claims after determining
34
that no genuine issue of material fact existed.
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Scarfo argued that, because
the determination of whether an entity constituted an “employer”
under Title VII was an element of her cause of action, the district
35
court erred in dismissing the case.
She claimed that the
determination of “employer” status should have been made by the
36
jury, which would have heard the rest of her case. Thus, without
classifying it as such, Scarfo was arguing the “intertwined with the
37
merits” exception to the jurisdictional fact doctrine.
Scarfo argued that under controlling circuit court authority, the
jury, not the court, should act as fact-finder in determining the
38
“single employer” issue for Title VII purposes.
In Garcia v.
39
Copenhaver, the Eleventh Circuit had held that, for purposes of
determining subject matter jurisdiction, whether a plaintiff was an
“employee” or an “independent contractor” under the ADEA was an
element of the plaintiff’s claim; as such, any facts material to that
40
determination were for the jury, not the court, to decide. The Scarfo
majority disagreed holding that whether a defendant constituted an
41
“employer” was a jurisdictional fact not intertwined with the merits.
In distinguishing the two cases, the Scarfo court noted that in Garcia it
was clear that the employer was subject to Title VII while in Scarfo, the
42
question was whether the employer was subject to Title VII. Any
43
issues of material fact in Garcia, therefore, had to go to the jury. In
33

Id.
Id.
35
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 958.
36
Id. at 961.
37
See 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350.
38
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961.
39
104 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1997).
40
Id. at 1265 n.9.
41
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961.
42
Id. The Scarfo court essentially argued that in Garcia, the employer was subject
to the ADEA no matter what—the issue was whether an individual was an employee
or an independent contractor. Id. In contrast, the very issue to be decided in Scarfo
was whether the employer was subject to Title VII at all. Id. This distinction is
unpersuasive, however, because the question of who is an “employer” necessarily
requires a determination of who is an “employee.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(2002). Thus, the questions being asked in both cases should be treated in the same
manner—as elements of the plaintiff’s claim.
43
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961 (citing Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1265 n.9).
34

2003

THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND RULE 12(b)(1)

1253

contrast, the Scarfo court held that the defendants’ “status as
‘employers’ [did not] implicate an element of the Title VII cause of
44
action.”
Whether the appellees met the statutory definition of
“employer” for Title VII purposes was a “threshold jurisdictional
issue” because, if the employer did not meet the requirements set
forth in the statute, “Title VII [was] inapplicable, and the district
45
court lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over Scarfo’s claims.” In
Scarfo, the question was whether certain entities could be aggregated
46
to form a single “employer” under Title VII. The court saw this as a
purely jurisdictional question to be decided solely by the court
because Title VII is “inapplicable” if there is not an “employer” as
47
defined by the statute. Accordingly, the case was dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction after the court found no Title VII
48
“employer.”
At first blush, Scarfo appears to be a narrow opinion; indeed, if it
is applied only to “aggregation of employer” claims, perhaps it is
narrow. But any question of fact relating to who is an “employer”
under a myriad of federal statutes may fall within the Scarfo court’s
49
view of jurisdictional facts. For example, in order to be covered
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Family and
50
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the defendant must be an “employer.”
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing this as part of her cause
51
of action. In addition to these statutes, plaintiffs filing claims under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Employee Retirement Income
Securities Act (ERISA), and Occupational Safety and Health Act

44

Id.
Id. Since the district court had applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
standard for summary judgment in its finding that there was not sufficient
integration, the jury would never have reached the question even if it was not a
purely jurisdictional fact. Id. at 960. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could have
simply affirmed the decision of the district court had the summary judgment
standard been correctly applied by the trial court. Id. The Court of Appeals,
however, reached out to decide the case and proceeded to incorrectly apply the
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Scarfo, 175 F.3d
957.
46
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 959-60.
47
Id. at 961.
48
Id. at 959.
49
See infra Part II.C.
50
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA,
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002).
51
See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 337 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
45
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(OSHA) must also prove that they are suing an “employer.” Each of
these federal statutes defines “employer” in terms similar or identical
53
to Title VII, and, applying the rationale of Scarfo, any questions
surrounding those definitions are jurisdictional ones for the court to
decide. If questions of fact concerning whether the entity meets the
requisite definition of “employer” under any of these statutes fall
within Scarfo’s definition of jurisdictional facts, then the issue of who
is covered by the law will almost always be decided by the court, not
54
the jury.
Moreover, although the parties in Scarfo litigated the question of
whether entities could be aggregated to constitute an “employer”
55
under Title VII, the statutory definition of “employer” under Title
VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes more often turns on
56
who counts as an “employee.”
Since an “employer” employs
“employees,” if individuals who work for the defendant are not
“employees,” or if there are an insufficient number of “employees,”
the defendant will not be an “employer.” Further, even if a
defendant does employ the requisite number of “employees,” the
57
plaintiff herself must still be an “employee” in order to sue. Under

52

See FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2002); ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2002); OSHA, 29
U.S.C. § 651 (2002).
53
The ADA defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar years, and any agent of
such person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002). The ADEA defines “employer” as “a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002). Under the
FMLA, “employer” is defined as “any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working
day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding
calendar year . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002). Title VII defines “employer” as
“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (2002).
54
See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
55
See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957.
56
See, e.g., Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding
that plaintiff was an “employee,” not a “partner,” for purposes of the ADEA); EEOC
v. North Knox Sch. Corp., 154 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “independent
contractors” are not employees and therefore not protected by the ADEA).
57
Note that whether the defendant is an “employer” and whether the plaintiff is
an “employee” under Title VII are treated as two different questions even though
perhaps they should not be. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). Whether a cause
of action exists is a different question from whether the cause of action will succeed.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to decide who
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Scarfo, whether the plaintiff is an employee, as opposed, say, to an
independent contractor or a partner, would seem to also go to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Additionally, beyond the question of whether the defendant is
an “employer” in terms of the number of “employees,” the
antidiscrimination statutes also impose a commerce requirement for
58
employers. With the Supreme Court’s new-found restrictions on
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, there may be
problems with whether a particular entity is engaged “in an industry
59
affecting commerce,” which all the statutes include in the definition
60
of an employer. While the courts obviously decide the legal issues
involved in such situations, Scarfo raises new questions about who
decides the facts when disputes related to an “employer” are
concerned. For instance, if courts were to follow Scarfo, any questions
of fact surrounding whether an industry or activity affects commerce
61
would be for the judge to decide. Under Scarfo, courts would not

counts as an employee in various contexts. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that plaintiff, an associate at the firm, was an employee; it
followed that the opportunity for partnership was also part of her employment);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (holding that independent
contractors are not employees under ERISA). The Court has also decided disputes
about computing the number of employees. See, e.g., Walters, 519 U.S. 202 (holding
that if employees were “on the payroll” during any given period, they could be
counted for purposes of the antidiscrimination statutes, regardless of whether or not
they were actually at work on any given day).
58
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA,
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).
59
For a particular entity to engage “in an industry affecting commerce,” the
entity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 379 U.S.
294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Compare Johnson v.
Alternatives, Inc., 2002 WL 1949738, *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002) (holding that the
purchase of a computer and $519 in long-distance telephone calls were not enough
to qualify as a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Graves v. Methodist Youth
Servs., 624 F. Supp. 429 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that long-distance phone charges of
$175 and the purchase of office supplies from nationally recognized entities were
insubstantial and did not amount to a substantial effect on interstate commerce), and
Vasquez v. Visions, Inc., 2002 WL 91905, *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2002) (holding that
long-distance phone charges and the purchase of membership for out-of-state
organizations amounting to $7,256 were not substantial enough to effect interstate
commerce), with EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(noting that extensive out-of-state expenses totaling more than $10,000 have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
60
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2002); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002); FMLA,
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2002); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002).
61
See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957. Note that should we go down this road, the doctrine
of “constitutional facts” may apply. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466
U.S. 485 (1984).
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treat such questions of fact as being “intertwined with the merits” of
the claim because, if the definition of “employer” is not met, the
62
federal statute is inapplicable.
Thus, the court would say such
questions are merely jurisdictional and will leave them for the judge
63
to decide. The result of this reasoning is that any plaintiff who sues
under a federal statute will be subject to the court’s determination of
jurisidictional facts as purely jurisdictional, regardless of whether
such facts also go to the merits of the cause of action.
Furthermore, while the determination of who constitutes an
“employer” under the relevant statutes is subject to the logic of Scarfo,
that logic is not limited to the employment realm. Federal statutes
creating private causes of action in a broad panoply of situations can
64
be brought within Scarfo’s reach. Even more important, whether
Rule 12(b)(1) permits a trial court to decide whether a defendant is
an entity engaged in commerce could have implications for a wide
variety of federal statutes beyond the employment context. The
application of a variety of federal laws could be recast in terms of
federal jurisdiction. To take an extreme example, the Emergency
65
Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA)
requires hospitals to provide “an appropriate medical screening
examination” to those coming to the emergency room to determine
66
if they have an “emergency medical condition.” If the screening
reveals such a condition, the hospital must then stabilize the patient’s
67
condition before she can be transferred or discharged.
Any
disputed facts surrounding whether a plaintiff was appropriately
screened in the emergency room or whether she was released before
being stabilized are not purely jurisdictional but are merits-related
68
because they require an examination of the plaintiff’s case. Under
the logic of Scarfo, however, such facts will be treated as jurisdictional
facts for the judge alone to decide.

62

Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961.
Id.
64
See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
65
42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2002).
66
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (a).
67
Id.
68
See Bloomer v. Norman Reg’l Hosp., No. 99-6074, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16099,
*5-7 (10th Cir. July 12, 2000) (noting that the district court should not have decided
the case on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, but rather, the court should have used a meritsbased motion because the facts relating to whether the patient was appropriately
screened and whether the patient’s condition was properly stabilized were not purely
jurisdictional but merits-related).
63
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II. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss challenges the federal court’s
69
subject matter jurisdiction. Because a federal court typically decides
questions of subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of
the case, the court “may hear evidence and make findings of fact
necessary to rule on the subject matter jurisdiction question before
70
trial . . . .”
These facts, which establish the subject matter
71
jurisdiction of the federal court, are known as jurisdictional facts. It
is well established that the court may decide jurisdictional facts if they
72
are not intertwined with the merits of the case.
A. The Application of Rule 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) challenges to subject matter jurisdiction come in
73
two forms: facial and factual attacks. In a facial attack, it is the
sufficiency of the pleading which is questioned, not the jurisdictional
74
75
fact itself. Thus, the court accepts all allegations as true. In a
factual attack, however, the court does not presume the allegations to
76
be true because the jurisdictional facts themselves are challenged.
The court is thus free to consider evidence outside of the pleadings
in an effort to satisfy itself as to the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction because such a challenge involves the court’s actual
77
power to hear the case.
There is little controversy over the general rule that, when faced
with a factual attack upon subject matter jurisdiction, courts can
78
decide jurisdictional facts. Rule 12(b)(1), read in conjunction with
79
Rule 12(d), explicitly so provides and the federal courts of appeals
69

5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 194.
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-37.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-39.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 12-41 (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990),
and Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1127 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988)); see, e.g., Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (noting that jurisdictional facts
need to be treated differently at different stages of the proceedings: plead them to
meet a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, provide evidence from which the fact could be found
to meet a Rule 56 motion, and prove them at trial).
78
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36.
79
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“The defenses specifically
enumerated (1)-(7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by
motion . . . shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party,
70
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80

81

have unanimously so held.
In Williamson v. Tucker, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made clear that the
district court’s power to decide whether it has jurisdiction over a case
is greater than the power it has when the merits of that same case are
82
finally reached.
The district court’s unique power to decide
jurisdictional facts allows the court to hear conflicting evidence and
decide for itself whether the requirements for jurisdiction are
83
84
satisfied. More recently, in Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, the Fifth
Circuit expressly stated that in resolving jurisdictional fact disputes,
“the court enjoys broad authority to order discovery, consider
extrinsic evidence, and hold evidentiary hearings in order to

unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until
the trial.”).
80
See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); Valentin
v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 2001); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648
(4th Cir. 1999); Lawrence, 919 F.2d 1525; Daniel, 839 F.2d 1124; Rosales v. United
States, 824 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1987); Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir.
1986); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1983); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981); Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d
507 (5th Cir. 1980); Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. General Tel. & Elects Corp., 594
F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1979); Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1978); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978),
vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 232 (1980); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884 (3d Cir. 1977); Exchange Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross
& Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976); State of Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Woody, 473
F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1973); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel
Co., 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972).
81
Williamson, 645 F.2d 404. In Williamson, the issue was whether joint venture
interests were “securities” within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 406. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that even though the district court enjoys a broad power to
decide jurisdictional facts, that power does not extend to situations in which such
facts are intertwined with the merits of the federal cause of action. Id. at 416.
According to the Court of Appeals, the claim that the joint venture interests were
“securities” within the meaning of the federal securities acts was not “so immaterial
or insubstantial as to warrant dismissal . . . for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
Rather, the claim was one in which the merits of the case were decidedly implicated;
thus, the district court was not justified in dismissing the claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
82
Id. at 413.
83
Id.
84
Valentin, 254 F.3d 358. In Valentin, a patient sued several Puerto Rican
healthcare providers for medical malpractice. Id. at 361. She claimed that she was a
citizen of Florida for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. The United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 362. The patient appealed, and the First Circuit held that the
district court was justified in its dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims because, where the
jurisdictional fact is not intertwined with the merits of the case, the court is able to
consider conflicting evidence and decide the fact in question. Id. at 363.
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The court explained:

A court’s authority to hear a particular case is a necessary
precondition to the proper performance of the judicial function.
Thus, when a factbound jurisdictional question looms, a court
must be allowed considerable leeway in weighing the proof,
drawing reasonable inferences, and satisfying itself that subject86
matter jurisdiction has attached.

Courts, therefore, can decide jurisdictional facts because the very
power of the court to issue a judgment depends on whether the court
87
has jurisdiction over the matter.
Although there is not much disagreement over the general rule
that courts can decide jurisdictional facts, there are many situations
where the court must look to the merits of the case in order to decide
88
the jurisdictional fact question.
In such situations, the right to
decide jurisdictional facts comes squarely into conflict with another
time-honored principle—the right of the plaintiff to a jury trial on
the merits of his claim. Accordingly, courts have fashioned an
exception to the general rule that courts can decide jurisdictional
facts: when jurisdictional facts are “intertwined with the merits” of the
89
cause of action, the general rule no longer applies.
B. The Development of the “Intertwined With the Merits” Exception to
Rule 12(b)(1)
The exception at issue in Scarfo, that jurisdictional facts cannot
be decided by the court when they are “intertwined with the merits,”
90
can be traced back to the late 1800s. Two early Supreme Court
cases, decided well before the adoption of the federal rules,
suggested that a court could not usurp the role of the jury and decide
91
the merits of a case under the rubric of determining jurisdiction.
After the adoption of the federal rules, the Supreme Court, in Land
92
v. Dollar, reinforced its earlier decisions implying that a court, under
the guise of determining jurisdiction, cannot assume the function of
93
94
In a fourth case, Bell v. Hood, the Supreme Court
the jury.
85

Id.
Id. at 364.
87
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36.
88
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 235.
89
Id.
90
See infra notes 91-95.
91
See Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 645 (1907); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S.
550, 565 (1886).
92
330 U.S. 731 (1947).
93
Id. at 735, 739.
86
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discussed the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts in terms broad enough to suggest that the courts should be
95
mindful of their use of Rule 12(b)(1) in federal question cases.
These four Supreme Court decisions form the basis of the federal
courts of appeals’ later development of the “intertwined with the
merits” exception.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
96
97
98
1938, the Court decided Barry v. Edmunds and Smithers v. Smith.
Barry, the earliest Supreme Court opinion, stated that “[i]n no case is
99
it permissible for the court to substitute itself for the jury . . . .” Barry
was a tort action where the amount of recoverable damages was not
fixed by law; one question, therefore, was whether the complaint met
100
the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement.
The Court
101
recognized the important role played by the jury. Emphasizing that
it is the jury’s role to decide such issues of fact, the Court held that
102
the jury’s verdict will stand unless tainted by gross error. The Court
also stated that the jury cannot be compelled to comply with a court’s
103
view of facts in evidence.
Smithers expanded on Barry’s holding, making clear that a trial
104
court’s authority to dismiss an action is “not unlimited.”
Specifically, the court’s “limits ought to be ascertained and observed,
lest under the guise of determining jurisdiction the merits of the
controversy between the parties be summarily decided without the
105
ordinary incidents of trial, including the right to a jury.”
In
Smithers, plaintiff landowner brought an action against defendants
106
claiming that defendants took his land from him. Plaintiff alleged
that jurisdiction existed based on diversity of citizenship and amount
107
in controversy. The court of appeals, however, determined that the
94

327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Id. at 680-83.
96
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004, at 28 (3d ed. 2002) (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective on September 16, 1938).
97
Barry, 116 U.S. 550.
98
Smithers, 204 U.S. 632.
99
Barry, 116 U.S. at 565.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 639-40.
107
Id.
95
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land taken and held by each defendant was worth less than $2,000
108
and dismissed the case. This, the Court held, addressed an element
109
of the merits rather than merely a jurisdictional fact. Accordingly,
the Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for further
proceedings presumably including a jury trial on the issue of the
110
worth of the land.
While Barry and Smithers are not clear in their
discussion of jurisdictional facts that might be intertwined with the
merits of the case, they establish that, even before the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 12(b)(1), the Court was concerned
about the possibility of infringing upon a plaintiff’s right to a trial by
111
jury under the guise of deciding “jurisdictional” questions.
112
After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
113
114
Court decided Land and Bell.
These ensuing decisions are
important as they illustrate that the earlier cases are consistent with
the later adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioners
115
in Land were members of the United States Maritime Commission.
The respondents, stockholders of Dollar Steamship Lines, Inc., Ltd.,
had entered into a contract with the petitioners whereby they
116
delivered “their common stock in Dollar . . . to the Commission.”
In return, the petitioners released the respondents from certain
117
obligations and made a loan to the respondents’ corporation. After
repaying the loans, respondents asked for the return of their shares,
118
claiming they had been pledged only as collateral.
When the
petitioners refused to return the shares, the respondents sued
119
The trial court held that the suit was against the United
them.
120
States and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that “the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on
jurisdictional grounds because the question of whether the doctrine
of sovereign immunity applied raised controversial questions of law

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Id. at 645-46.
Id.
Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645-46.
See Barry, 116 U.S. 550; see also Smithers, 204 U.S. 632.
4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98.
330 U.S. 731 (1947).
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Land, 330 U.S. at 733.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
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121

and fact proper for presentation to a trial court.”
The petitioners
122
The Court granted the petition and
sought a writ of certiorari.
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the
allegations of the complaint, if proven, would illustrate that the
petitioners were unlawfully withholding the respondents’ property by
123
claiming it belonged to the United States.
Thus, the Court
distinguished the “type of case where the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on a decision of the merits” from a case in which the
124
jurisdictional issue stands on its own. The Court, however, went no
further than to state this difference between the two types of cases.
In Bell, the Court did not directly address whether a
jurisdictional fact could be decided by the court without regard to
125
whether it was part of the merits. The Court, however, wrote
broadly about the appropriate approach to jurisdiction in federal
question cases: “where the complaint . . . is so drawn as to seek
recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
the federal court, but for two possible exceptions . . . must entertain
126
the suit . . . .” The two exceptions referred to are: 1) when a claim
appears to be “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction,” and 2) when a claim “is wholly insubstantial
127
or frivolous.”
If either of these exceptions applies, the court may
128
Under Bell, if a claim does not fit
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
into either of these two exceptions, then the court has jurisdiction
129
over the case, and the case may not be dismissed.
Under this
formulation, any case involving a non-frivolous, non-pretextual claim
in which the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits
121

Land v. Dollar, 154 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 329 U.S. 700 (1946).
Land, 329 U.S. 700.
123
Land, 330 U.S. at 734-35.
124
Id.
125
Bell, 327 U.S. 678. The petitioners in Bell sued agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations in federal district court. Id. at 679. The petitioners alleged that their
rights under Amendments IV and V of the United States Constitution had been
violated. Id. The district court dismissed the petitioner’s suit and the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 680. The Supreme Court, however, reversed
the dismissal of the petitioner’s suit. Id. at 684-85. The Court noted that the
petitioner’s complaint sought recovery directly under the United States Constitution
and was neither frivolous nor wholly insubstantial. Id. at 683. Thus, the district court
was required to entertain the suit: “Whether petitioners could recover monetary
judgments against respondents for alleged constitutional violations was an issue of
law that the district court had jurisdiction to consider.” Id. at 678.
126
Id. at 681-82.
127
Id. at 682-83.
128
Id. at 682.
129
Id. at 682-83.
122
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would not be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Indeed,
following the logic of Bell, the courts should generally take a very
narrow approach to Rule 12(b)(1) in federal question cases.
These Supreme Court cases only hinted to what we now identify
as the “intertwined with the merits” exception. The courts of appeals
were left to interpret the early decisions of the Supreme Court and
frame their own understanding of what we now denominate this
130
exception. Two early court of appeals cases, Schramm v. Oakes and
131
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., suggested
that district courts could not always decide the jurisdictional issue
132
separate from the merits.
In Schramm, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that “where the issue of
jurisdiction is dependant upon a decision on the merits . . . the trial
court should determine jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on
133
This, the court stated, would “prevent a summary
the merits.”
decision on the merits without the ordinary incidents of a trial,
134
including the right to a jury.” Schramm was a diversity action arising
out of an automobile collision, and the Tenth Circuit held that the
135
district court improperly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action. The action
arose under the New Mexico Nonresident Motorist Statute and
involved a vehicle driven by an employee of nonresidents who had an
136
The question was whether the statute
interest in the automobile.
reached the nonresidents in this situation, and the court held that
the plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity during a trial
on the merits to prove the jurisdiction of the nonresidents under the
137
statute.
Since jurisdiction was tied to the merits of the cause of
action, the court found it was appropriate to postpone a
determination of jurisdiction and allow the case to be decided on the

130

352 F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1965).
253 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958).
132
Schramm, 352 F.2d 143; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 253 F.2d 780.
133
Schramm, 352 F.2d at 149.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 150 (Schramm involved personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction). The
same rules, however, apply in both situations and they are (and should be) treated
the same.
136
Id.
137
Id. If the appellants could establish a master-servant or agency relationship,
liability might be established. Id. at 150. Additionally, the court noted that because a
permit was required to take the car through the State of New Mexico, it was possible
“that the owner would be liable for acts even of an independent contractor where the
independent contractor operates a vehicle under a highway permit or franchise
granted the owner.” Id.
131
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138

merits. The plaintiffs should not have been denied the opportunity
to move past the preliminary hearing, the court stated, because the
139
possibility existed for proving the jurisdiction of the nonresidents.
140
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., a diversity proceeding commenced by
the plaintiff to recover money for the loss of goods in an intrastate
shipment, was initially dismissed by the district court for not meeting
141
§ 1332’s amount in controversy requirement. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that because it “did not appear to a legal certainty” from
the face of the pleadings that the plaintiff could not recover the sum
142
which it claimed, it was error to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.
The
court declared that “where the jurisdictional issue as to amount in
controversy can not be decided without the ruling constituting at the
same time a ruling on the merits of the case, the case should be
heard and determined on its merits through regular trial
143
procedure.”
Schramm and Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. both alluded to an
“intertwined with the merits” exception, but the exception was first
clearly expressed in a Fifth Circuit opinion, McBeath v. Inter-American
144
Citizens for Decency Committee. The Fifth Circuit opined that:
Undoubtedly, under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure a court may determine the prerequisites to jurisdiction
in advance of a trial on the merits. However, where the factual
and jurisdictional issues are completely intermeshed the

138

Schramm, 352 F.2d at 149.
Id. at 150.
140
253 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1958).
141
Id. at 781.
142
Id. at 784.
The “legal certainty” test referred to in Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. has long been
recognized as the standard used in amount in controversy cases. See, e.g., Zacharia v.
Harbor Island Spa, Inc., 684 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976); Fehling v. Cantonwine, 522 F.2d 604 (10th Cir.
1975); Gill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1972). When a plaintiff brings a
case under § 1332, his claim that the amount in controversy exceeds the requisite
jurisdictional amount is “deemed to be made in good faith so long as it is not clear to
a legal certainty that the claimant could not recover a judgment exceeding the
jurisdictional amount.” 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 231.
Essentially, this seems to be a version or application of the “intertwined with the
merits” exception. Since the amount in controversy is rather clearly intertwined with
the merits, courts should not dismiss a case for an insufficient amount in controversy
unless they can say, to a legal certainty, that the requisite amount could not be
recovered. Absent that legal certainty, for a court to dismiss a case as having an
insufficient amount in controversy would be to decide a crucial part of the merits in
the guise of deciding a jurisdictional fact.
143
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 253 F.2d at 784.
144
374 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1967).
139
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jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, for it is
145
impossible to decide the one without the other.

In McBeath, the plaintiff, a newspaper publisher, sued the defendants
for injuring him in violation of the Sherman Act by conspiring to
146
restrain interstate and foreign trade.
The defendants moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the court held that
“the question of jurisdiction here, including the existence of a
conspiracy and a boycott or secondary boycott and their significant
effect on interstate commerce, is . . . inextricably connected with the
147
merits of the case . . . .” Therefore, these issues should be resolved
148
at trial together with the merits of the case.
The earlier Supreme Court cases, especially Land and Bell, had
an instrumental role in McBeath’s clear articulation of the
149
In
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1).
McBeath, the court stated that “where the factual and jurisdictional
issues are completely intermeshed the jurisdictional issues should be
150
This is consistent with the Supreme
referred to the merits . . . .”
Court cases, which make clear that a court’s power to dismiss a case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is limited when a jurisdictional
issue cannot be decided without also ruling on the merits of the
151
plaintiff’s claim. McBeath is also consistent with Bell because, when
jurisdictional facts are “intermeshed” with the merits of the cause of
action, the federal court must exercise jurisdiction over the case and
152
rule on the merits.
In so doing, McBeath does not narrow or
broaden the scope of subject matter jurisdiction as set forth in Bell.
Further, McBeath is generally representative of the courts of appeals’
decisions on the general question of the exercise of Rule 12(b)(1)
153
power.

145

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 360. Plaintiff here invoked jurisdiction “under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 which
confers jurisdiction on district courts of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress protecting trade and commerce against restraints, and under the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, which also authorizes such a suit and provides for treble damages
sustained by reason of injury resulting from violations of antitrust laws.” Id. In
situations such as this, where jurisdiction is based on a specialized jurisdictional grant
instead of on § 1331, the analysis in terms of jurisdictional facts and the “intertwined
with the merits” exception is the same. Id.
147
Id. at 363.
148
Id.
149
See McBeath, 374 F.2d 359.
150
Id. at 363.
151
See supra notes 91-129 and accompanying text.
152
McBeath, 374 F.2d at 362-63.
153
See, e.g., Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that
146
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The question remains, however, whether McBeath and related
cases are required by either Supreme Court authority. Entangled
with this question, not surprisingly, is the extent to which the
Supreme Court’s precedents are rooted in the constitutional right to
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Supreme Court
authority makes it clear that the jury plays an important role in
154
determining issues of fact.
The function of the “intertwined with
the merits” exception, to the extent that it departs from the plain
language of Rule 12(b)(1), is to ensure that issues of fact normally
decided by the jury are not decided by the court under the rubric of
“jurisdictional facts.” In short, the exception polices the application
of Rule 12(b)(1) to ensure that the right to a jury trial is preserved.
To the extent that the exception to Rule 12(b)(1) must be applied
consistently and uniformly in order to preserve the essential role
played by the jury, a clear articulation of the “intertwined with the
merits” exception is necessary.
C. The Application of the “Intertwined With the Merits” Exception to
Rule 12(b)(1)
While the courts of appeals generally agree on how Rule
12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception are supposed
to be applied, it is evident that the actual application of Rule
155
12(b)(1) and the exception has not been consistent. Not only are
156
the courts of appeals inconsistent with each other, but, what is most
when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the court can
assume jurisdiction and defer deciding on such issue until trial); United States v.
North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that, because the jurisdictional
issue requires proof of what is also needed to win on the merits, the jurisdictional
issues in the Title VII suit are not suited for resolution by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion);
Bell v. United States, 127 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that whether the
government’s actions are within the limited waiver provided by the FTCA is an
example of a jurisdictional fact intertwined with the merits of the case); Lawrence v.
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that when jurisdictional facts
are intertwined with the merits of the claim, any jurisdictional issues should not be
decided on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion but should rather be held for a determination
on the merits); Barrett v. United States, 853 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1988).
154
See Barry, 116 U.S. at 565 (stating that “[i]n no case is it permissible for the
court to substitute itself for the jury”); Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645 (stating that the
court’s “limits ought to be ascertained” in order to prevent the court from usurping
the role of the jury and denying the plaintiff his right to a jury trial).
155
See infra Part II.C. Note that although it is unclear in many of these cases
whether the jurisdictional grant relied upon is § 1331 or another specialized grant of
jurisdiction, the analysis of jurisdictional facts and the “intertwined with merits”
exception does not change. See supra notes 7, 144-48 and accompanying text; see also
infra Part IV.
156
While the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that
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157

alarming are the inconsistencies within each circuit.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
provides a good example of the inconsistent application of Rule
12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception. Hukill v.
158
159
Auto Care, Inc., and United States v. North Carolina, both decided in
1999, differ in their approach to jurisdictional facts. In Hukill, the
court, in analyzing a claim under the FMLA, held that, if the
defendant is not an “employer” as defined by the statute, the district
160
In contrast, in North
court has no subject matter jurisdiction.
Carolina, the court decided that the language of Title VII requiring a
pattern or practice of discrimination is not jurisdictional but is meritsrelated because, in order to prevail on the merits, the United States
161
must prove a pattern or practice of discrimination.
While the two

the fifteen-employee requirements of Title VII and the ADA, are not jurisdictional,
many of the other circuits, as will be further examined, have inconsistent rulings on
this or similar issues. See Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely
jurisdictional where the claim is non-frivolous); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148
F.3d 676, 677 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate
that the defendant has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory
requirement,” thus the issue is not purely jurisdictional); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier
Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the employee
requirement under the ADA is not purely jurisdictional but implicates the merits of
the case so Rule 12(b)(1) should not be applied).
The Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, unlike many of the
other circuits, all reached the conclusion that the threshold number of employees is
not purely jurisdictional by reasoning that, if the basis for subject matter jurisdiction
is also an element of the plaintiff’s federal cause of action, then the court must
assume jurisdiction over the case and reserve further inquiry for the trial on the
merits unless the claim is frivolous or pre-textual. Da Silva, 229 F.3d at 364 (quoting
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1190 (2d Cir. 1996)
(noting that “in federal question cases, the very statute that creates the cause of
action often confers jurisdiction as well . . . [and that since] jurisdiction is authority
to decide the case either way . . . unsuccessful as well as successful suits may be
brought upon the act”)); Sharpe, 148 F.3d at 677; St. Francis, 117 F.3d at 624 (citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)); see also Bleiler v. Cristwood Constr. Inc., 72 F.3d
13 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that “the conclusion that . . . Cristwood . . . [is not] a
statutory [employer] merely reflects the lack of a remedy against them under federal
law, not the lack of a federal question”).
This is consistent with Bell because under Bell, once the claim is based on a
federal statute, the only way the court can dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is if the claim is so insubstantial that it lacks any merit.
157
See infra Part II.C.
158
192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999).
159
180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 1999).
160
Hukill, 192 F.3d at 441.
161
North Carolina, 180 F.3d at 580. Arguably, the question of whether there is a
“pattern or practice of discrimination” applies only to the proper plaintiff in the suit.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2002). Just as this is a merits-related issue, however, so
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cases involve different federal statutes, the FMLA and Title VII, the
two results are irreconcilable because both cases take an element of
162
the cause of action, which also happens to be the basis for subject
163
matter jurisdiction, and reach different results.
Similar inconsistencies can be found in the Fifth Circuit. In
164
Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc., the court of appeals held that
the defendant’s failure to meet the threshold number of employees
necessary for Title VII’s definition of an employer warrants dismissal
165
of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In two earlier
166
167
cases, however, Clark v. Tarrant County and Williamson v. Tucker,
the court held that, when an element of the plaintiff’s federal cause
of action is also a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court
168
should assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits.
In
Clark, the federal cause of action was Title VII and the dispute once
again focused on the requisite number of employees for a Title VII
169
“employer.”
Inconsistencies have plagued the Ninth Circuit as well. Courts
to is whether or not the defendant meets the requisite number of employees. Id.
162
In Hukill, the element referred to is the threshold number of employees
necessary to satisfy the definition of an employer under the FMLA. 192 F.3d at 44142. In North Carolina, the court determined that the element of the cause of action is
the threshold requirement that there be a pattern or practice of discrimination
present. 180 F.3d at 580-81.
163
Note the results are not only inconsistent within the circuit, but are also
inconsistent as applied to Bell. Neither case should have been dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because there was a federal question involved and the
claims did not fit into either of the two allowed exceptions noted in Bell: the claims
were neither frivolous nor pre-textual. See, e.g., Bell, 327 U.S. 678.
164
32 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1994).
165
Id. at 200.
166
798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986).
167
645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981).
168
Clark, 798 F.2d at 742; Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415 (noting that “where the
defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence
of a federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court . . . is to
find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the
merits of the plaintiff’s case . . . [because] in that situation no purpose is served by
indirectly arguing the merits in the context of federal jurisdiction”).
Once the merits are reached, if the federal claim fails, the court should dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), not Rule 12(b)(1):
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading,
whether a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made
by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
169
Clark, 798 F.2d at 742.
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have taken two different approaches to the question of when a
jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the merits of the case.
170
According to Brown v. Atkinson, Careau Group v. United Farm Workers
171
172
of America, and Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises, Inc., a
jurisdictional fact is intertwined with the merits when the same
provision is the basis for both jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s
173
substantive federal claims.
A case that preceded these three
174
opinions, however, Childs v. Local 18, decided that, even though
Title VII was both the basis for jurisdiction and the basis for the
plaintiff’s claims, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction where the threshold number of employees was not
175
met.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has also been inconsistent. In 2002, it
176
decided Calvert v. Midwest Restoration Services, Inc., holding that the
number of employees required to make Title VII applicable was a
177
This was
jurisdictional issue that could be decided by the court.
178
consistent with a 1980 case, Owens v. Rush, in which it also held that

170

1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998) (holding that the
number of employees required for Title VII to apply is not purely jurisdictional since
the same statute that makes up the federal cause of action is also the basis for
jurisdiction).
171
940 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the jurisdictional issue was also a
merits issue because the proof needed to prevail on the merits was the same proof
required to show jurisdiction).
172
711 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that where the statute provides the basis
for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff’s
substantive claims, the jurisdictional issue and the merits will be considered
intertwined) (quoting Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 602
(9th Cir. 1976)).
173
Brown, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24098, at *2; Careau, 940 F.2d at 1293; Sun Valley
Gasoline, 711 F.2d at 139-40.
174
719 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1983).
175
Id.
176
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747 (10th Cir. May 22, 2002).
177
Id. at *8.
178
636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir. 1980). Why, in 1980, the court was deciding whether
the fifteen-employee requirement was jurisdictional is perplexing since prior to 1991,
there was no right to a jury trial under Title VII. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196 (stating
that “jury trial is not required in an action for reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson,
444 F.2d at 802 (stating that the demand for backpay under Title VII is to be
determined through the exercise of the court’s discretion). Perhaps it was an easy
way for the court to dismiss the case because Rule 12(b)(1) existed and not much
analysis was needed to support the court’s ruling. Arguably, at the time Owens was
decided, the court enjoyed a broad power to decide such facts in Title VII cases as
jurisdictional issues because there was no possibility of infringing upon the plaintiff’s
right to a jury trial.
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the fifteen-employee requirement was jurisdictional.
Calvert,
however, did not mention cases decided after Owens, which stated
that where subject matter jurisdiction is based upon the same
provision that creates the plaintiff’s federal cause of action, the court
180
must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the merits.
The first of these cases to articulate the proposition was Wheeler v.
181
which declared that, when jurisdiction and the
Hurdman,
substantive claim are based upon the same federal statute, the court
182
should assume jurisdiction; this is consistent with Bell. The result of
183
Calvert and Owens, however, is not.

179

Calvert, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747, at *8.
See Sizova v. Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., 282 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting that if the resolution of the jurisdictional issue requires a resolution of an
aspect of the plaintiff’s substantive claim, then the jurisdictional issue is intertwined
with the merits and Rule 12 (b)(1) cannot apply); Bloomer v. Norman Reg’l Hosp.,
No. 99-6074, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 16099 (10th Cir. July 12, 2000) (noting that,
because the basis for jurisdiction and the plaintiff’s substantive claim is the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA), the
court has to assume jurisdiction unless the claim is frivolous or immaterial); Pringle
v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the determination of
whether the Feres doctrine is applicable to the case calls into question the merits of
the plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim so any dismissal should be for
failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, not for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
that the determination of whether one is an “employer” under Title VII is not a
purely jurisdictional issue but also implicates the merits because the jurisdictional
issue is dependant on the same statute which forms the basis of the plaintiff’s federal
cause of action) (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1986));
Sun Valley Gasoline, 711 F.2d at 139; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d
597, 602 (9th Cir. 1976).
181
825 F.2d 257.
182
Id. at 259. Compare Wheeler, 825 F.2d 257 (stating that where subject matter
jurisdiction is based upon the same provision which creates the plaintiff’s federal
cause of action, the court must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the
merits), with Bell, 327 U.S. 678 (noting that when a federal statute is the basis for the
plaintiff’s claim, the court should assume jurisdiction unless the claim is frivolous or
wholly insubstantial).
Note that two of the cases decided after Wheeler, Pringle and Sizova, tried to
narrow Wheeler by stating that it was not enough that the jurisdictional statute and the
plaintiff’s substantive claim were based upon the same federal statute, but that
resolution of the jurisdictional issue had to depend upon resolution of an aspect of
the substantive claim. See Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1222-23; Sizova, 282 F.3d at 1324-25.
This is a circular argument, however, because if the jurisdictional statute and the
statute providing the basis for the substantive claim are one and the same, then
naturally resolution of a jurisdictional element will require resolution of an element
of the plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, as articulated in Bell, it should be enough for
subject matter jurisdiction that the plaintiff’s cause of action is based upon a federal
statute. See Bell, 327 U.S. 678.
183
Compare Wheeler, 825 F.2d 257, 259 (stating that where subject matter
jurisdiction is based upon the same provision which creates the plaintiff’s federal
180
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This analysis of circuit court authority illustrates the extent to
which courts have inconsistently applied the “intertwined with the
merits” exception. Not only are the circuits themselves inconsistent
in their application of the exception, but more importantly, there are
inconsistencies within the individual circuits. The scope of this
inconsistency exemplifies the confusion surrounding Rule 12(b)(1)
and the “intertwined with merits” exception, and also makes clear
that, in order to ensure plaintiffs are treated fairly and uniformly
throughout the circuits, the law must be clarified.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a trial by jury in
184
some civil cases.
The language of the amendment preserves the
185
right to a jury trial only for “[s]uits at common law.” To determine
whether a suit is one which existed at common law, it has generally
been accepted that the courts must employ the “so-called historical
test” of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial; in other words,
the court must be “guided by the practice of English courts in
186
1791.”
If, in 1791 English practice, the jury would have been

cause of action, the court must assume jurisdiction and then decide the case on the
merits), and Bell, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (noting that when a federal statute is the basis
for the plaintiff’s claim, the court should assume jurisdiction unless the claim is
frivolous or wholly insubstantial), with Calvert, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747, *8
(holding that the number of employees required to make Title VII applicable is
jurisdictional; having a federal statute as the basis for your claim is not enough for
subject matter jurisdiction), and Owens, 636 F.2d 283, 287 (stating that the fifteenemployee requirement is jurisdictional; Title VII claim is not enough to establish
subject matter jurisdiction).
Both Calvert and Owens, if following Bell, would have assumed jurisdiction over
the case and then would have decided the case on the merits. See Bell, 327 U.S. 678.
Then, if the federal claim failed, the case would have been properly dismissed under
Rule 12 (b)(6), not Rule 12 (b)(1). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
184
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id.
185
Id.
186
See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998);
Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991); Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1986); Baltimore & Carolina Line Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654
(1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); see also Margaret L. Moses, What the
Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 183, 187-92 (2000); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1021-24 (1992);
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“impaneled” in the particular type of case, then “generally a jury is
187
required by the [S]eventh [A]mendment.”
Once the right to a jury trial has been established, the question
188
remains as to the scope of that right.
The Supreme Court has
noted that “[t]he [Seventh] Amendment [does] not bind the federal
courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trials
according to the common law in 1791 any more than it tie[s] them to
the common law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence
189
then prevailing.”
An important question, therefore, is whether
such changes in practice or procedure infringe upon the very
substance of the Seventh Amendment—the “jury’s role as finder of
190
fact?”
The substance of the guarantee preserved by the Seventh
Amendment is the jury’s role as the ultimate trier of fact. In order to
preserve the essence of the Seventh Amendment, a court must be
careful not to abuse its power under Rule 12(b)(1).
Rule 12(b)(1) allows a judge to decide jurisdictional facts
without a jury trial; the Seventh Amendment preserves the role of the
191
jury as fact-finder.
Although seemingly irreconcilable, these two
concepts are not necessarily incompatible with each other. In cases
decided only by a bench trial—as was true for Title VII before the
192
Civil Rights Act of 1991 —there is no constitutional barrier to the
application of Rule 12(b)(1) as it is written, and there may be no
need for an “intertwined with the merits” exception. In such cases,
whether the court decides a question early, by resolving a Rule
193
12(b)(1) motion, or later, after a full trial, implicates only questions
of judicial efficiency. Where, however, the constitutional right to a

Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486-87 (1975); Charles W. Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 (1973);
Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 319 (1966).
187
Wolfram, supra note 186, at 640.
188
Moses, supra note 186, at 199.
189
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943); see also Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (citing the decision in Galloway with approval).
190
Moses, supra note 186, at 199-200; see also Walker v. New Mexico & Southern
Pacific R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (noting that the substance of the Seventh
Amendment is the right to a jury trial; it is the function of the jury and not the court
to decide questions of fact).
191
2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36; Moses, supra note 186, at 199-200.
192
See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196-97 (stating that “jury trial is not required in an action
for reinstatement and backpay”); Robinson, 444 F.2d at 802 (stating that the demand
for backpay under Title VII is to be determined through the exercise of the court’s
discretion).
193
See FED. R. CIV. P. 38-39 (authorizing the use of partial trials).
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trial by jury attaches to a plaintiff’s claim, the only way that Rule
12(b)(1) does not limit the right to a trial by jury is if it is interpreted
to apply only to purely jurisdictional facts—that is, those facts that are
194
not intertwined with the merits of the claim. Thus, the “intertwined
with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1) is necessary to preserve
the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on any issue involving the merits of
the case. Allowing a judge to decide issues that are intertwined with
the merits of a plaintiff’s case infringes upon the plaintiff’s right to a
195
trial by jury.
A. Significance of the Right to a Trial By Jury
The significance of a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial is evidenced
196
by Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover.
Beacon Theaters, Inc., sought
194

Although Title VII now clearly provides a statutory right to a jury trial, whether
there is also a constitutional right to a jury trial under Title VII is still unresolved. If
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial, then Congress can restrict it;
consequently, there would no longer be any question regarding whether Rule
12(b)(1) and the inconsistent application of the “intertwined with the merits”
exception infringes upon the constitutional right to a jury trial. The problem with
this argument, however, is that Title VII now provides both compensatory and
punitive damages. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the constitutional right to a
jury trial is not implicated.
195
See Barry, 116 U.S. at 565; see also Smithers, 204 U.S. at 645.
A response to the argument that allowing a judge to decide issues that are
intertwined with merits of the plaintiff’s case infringes upon the plaintiff’s right to a
jury trial is that the jury trial problem can be avoided by denying any preclusive effect
to the federal court’s factfinding if the case is refiled in state court. If this seems
inconsistent with the premises of the federal court’s dismissal, however, perhaps it
illustrates that the federal court’s dismissal was actually a decision on the merits, and
not simply a jurisdictional determination.
196
359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon, Fox West Coast Theaters asked for declaratory
relief against Beacon Theaters. Id. at 502. Fox alleged that there was a controversy
under both the Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2,
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 38 Stat. 731. Id. In its complaint entitled
“Complaint for Declaratory Relief,” Fox asserted that it operated a movie theater in
San Bernardino, California, and that it had exclusive rights from movie distributors
to show “first run” pictures in the “San Bernardino competitive area.” Id. at 502-03.
Fox also asserted that the contracts with the movie distributors provided it with
“clearance”—a period in which no other theater could exhibit the same picture. Id.
at 502.
Beacon Theaters had built a drive-in theater about eleven miles out of San
Bernardino; it notified Fox that it considered Fox’s contracts with the movie
distributors to be a violation of anti-trust laws. Id. Fox alleged in its complaint that
Beacon threatened a treble damage suit against Fox and its distributors and that this
deprived Fox of a “valuable property right—the right to negotiate for exclusive firstrun contracts.” Id. Fox then asked for both an injunction to prevent Beacon from
commencing any action against it under the antitrust laws, and a declaration that a
grant of “clearance” between Fox and Beacon was reasonable and not in violation of
antitrust laws. Id. at 502-03. Beacon’s answer and counterclaim against Fox “asserted
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mandamus to require a district court judge to vacate orders that
197
The district judge had
allegedly deprived it of a jury trial.
compelled Beacon Theaters to split up its claims, trying some to the
198
judge and others to the jury. The Supreme Court found this to be
impermissible: where the petitioner is seeking legal relief, the
constitutional right to a jury trial cannot be defeated simply by
199
joining a demand for equitable relief.
The Court stated,
“[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such
importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
200
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” More important than
this general principle was the Court’s finding that the trial court’s
exercise of discretion to deprive Beacon Theaters of a full jury trial
201
was not justifiable.
A similar result was reached more recently in Lytle v. Household
202
Manufacturing, Inc.,
where the lower court had dismissed the
petitioner’s § 1981 legal claims and held a bench trial on the
203
remaining Title VII equitable claims. After reversing the dismissal
of the § 1981 claims, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of

that there was no substantial competition between the two theaters, that the
clearances granted were therefore unreasonable, and that a conspiracy existed
between Fox and its distributors to manipulate contracts . . . so as to restrain trade
and monopolize first-run pictures . . . in violation of the anti-trust laws.” Id. at 503.
Beacon asked for a jury trial of all the factual issues in the case. Id. The district
court, however, viewed the issues raised by Fox’s “Complaint for Declaratory Relief”
as essentially equitable. Id. It, therefore, found that the issues raised by Fox should
be tried by the court alone before the jury determined the validity of the anti-trust
violations that Beacon alleged in its counterclaim. Id.
197
Beacon, 359 U.S. at 501.
198
Id. at 503-05.
199
Id. at 510.
200
Id. at 501 (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935)).
201
Id. at 508.
202
494 U.S. 545 (1990). Petitioner Lytle, an African-American, filed a cause of
action under both Title VII and § 1981, alleging that respondent Schwitzer had
terminated his employment because of race and had later retaliated against him for
filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by not
providing adequate references to prospective employers. Id. at 547-48. He requested
a jury trial for all applicable issues. Id. at 548. The district court, however, dismissed
the petitioner’s § 1981 claims and decided that Title VII provided an exclusive
remedy. Id. It then held a bench trial on the petitioner’s Title VII claims. Id. at 549.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, although finding that the lower court’s decision
as to the § 1981 claims was erroneous, nevertheless held that the District Court’s
findings regarding the Title VII claims collaterally estopped the petitioner from
litigating his § 1981 claims “because the elements of a cause of action under § 1981
are identical to those under Title VII.” Id. at 549.
203
Id. at 548-49.
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collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of the issues decided by
the judge because it would not “constitute a second, separate
204
action.”
It was the lower court’s erroneous dismissal of the
petitioner’s § 1981 claims that allowed it to resolve the equitable
205
If the § 1981
claims through a bench trial in the first instance.
claims had not been wrongfully dismissed, Lytle would have been
entitled to a full jury trial on any issues common to both the § 1981
206
legal claims and the Title VII equitable claims.
Consequently, the
jury’s determinations of both legal and factual issues could not then
have been disregarded by the district court upon consideration of the
207
petitioner’s equitable claims.
Both Beacon and Lytle illustrate the significance of the right to a
208
jury trial.
Courts, while having broad discretion to decide
jurisdictional facts, may not exercise that discretion where it would
209
infringe upon the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. By deciding issues
that are intertwined with the merits of the case under the guise of
determining a purely jurisdictional issue, courts are limiting a
plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury.
The “intertwined with the merits” exception is, thus, not merely
a judge-made rule interpreting Rule 12(b)(1), but rather a
210
constitutionally-mandated application of that Rule.
Without it,
plaintiffs would be denied their right to have a trial by jury. It is not
enough, however, to recognize that such an exception exists. As
discussed earlier, the courts of appeals are extremely inconsistent in
211
their application of the “intertwined with the merits” exception. If

204

Id. The Court distinguished Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979),
by noting that the holding in Parklane, “that a court’s determinations of issues in an
equitable action could collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a
subsequent legal action without violating a litigant’s right to a jury trial,” did not
apply because Lytle’s § 1981 claim was not a subsequent legal action. Lytle, 494 U.S.
at 547. Where the court wrongfully dismisses a plaintiff’s legal claims, relitigation of
the equitable issues decided by the court in a bench trial is permissible. Id.
205
Lytle, 494 U.S. at 548-49.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 556.
208
See Beacon, 359 U.S. 500; see also Lytle, 494 U.S. 545.
209
See generally Beacon, 359 U.S. 500; Lytle, 494 U.S. 545.
210
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Arguably, it is an interpretation of the
rules inspired by such constitutional concerns as avoiding unnecessary constitutional
decisions.
211
Compare Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely jurisdictional
where the claim is non-frivolous); Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676 (7th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the defendant
has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory requirement,” thus
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the exception is not applied both correctly and consistently plaintiffs
212
will continue to lose their right to a jury trial.
B. Title VII & The Right to a Jury Trial
While the “intertwined with the merits” exception has been
applied in cases dealing with a variety of federal statutes, one area in
which the application of the exception is notably inconsistent is in
213
Title VII cases. Before 1991, in Title VII cases, judges could decide
purely jurisdictional facts, jurisdictional facts that were intertwined
with the merits, and purely merits-related facts because there was no
214
right to a jury trial under Title VII. At the time, Rule 12(b)(1) was
an efficient method of filtering out the frivolous and insubstantial
cases; as importantly, it did so without infringing upon the rights of
215
any parties to the suit.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however,
the issue is not purely jurisdictional); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117
F.3d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the employee requirement under the ADA is
not a purely jurisdictional but implicates the merits of the case so Rule 12(b)(1)
should not be applied), and United States v. North Carolina, 180 F.3d 574 (4th Cir.
1999) (noting that the language of Title VII requiring a “pattern or practice of
discrimination” is not jurisdictional but merits-related), with Hukill v. Auto Care,
Inc., 192 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the employee requirement under the
FMLA is purely jurisdictional), and Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enters., Inc., 32 F.3d
197 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
warranted where the defendant did not meet the threshold number of employees
necessary under Title VII).
212
As discussed earlier, the function of the “intertwined with the merits”
exception is to ensure that issues of fact normally decided by the jury are not
summarily decided by the court. See supra Part II.B. Thus, the purpose of the
exception is to make certain that the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial is not infringed
upon. Id. In order for the exception to serve its purpose, it must be applied both
consistently and correctly. Note that whether the right to a jury trial stems from the
Constitution or a statute, the analysis of such a right in light of the “intertwined with
the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1) remains the same. See infra notes 213-16.
213
Compare Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
the threshold number of employees in a Title VII case is not purely jurisdictional
where the claim is non-frivolous), and Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the “plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the
defendant has 15 employees is just like any other failure to meet a statutory
requirement,” thus the issue is not purely jurisdictional), with Calvert v. Midwest
Restoration Services, Inc., No. 01-5201, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 9747 (10th Cir. May
22, 2002) (holding that the number of employees required to make Title VII
applicable was a jurisdictional issue that could be decided by the court), and
Greenless v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc., 32 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is warranted where the defendant did
not meet the threshold number of employees necessary under Title VII).
214
Since there was no right to a jury trial, by default all issues of fact had to be
decided by the court regardless of whether they were intertwined with the merits. See
Curtis, 415 U.S. 189; Robinson, 444 F.2d 791.
215
Because the constitutional right to a jury trial exists only for “suits at common
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amended Title VII to include a statutory right to a trial by jury.
Thus, judges can no longer decide jurisdictional facts that are
intertwined with the merits of a Title VII case without infringing
upon the plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury. The problem, however, is
that because of the confusion surrounding the application of the
“intertwined with the merits” exception, many courts are in fact
restricting plaintiffs’ right to a trial by jury.
In Scarfo, plaintiff’s Title VII claim was dismissed by the Eleventh
Circuit because the court found that whether a defendant constituted
an “employer” was a jurisdictional fact not intertwined with the merits
217
of the case. This holding, and others like it, raises the question of
how courts can conclude that an element of a plaintiff’s Title VII
claim is not intertwined with the merits of the case, but is purely
jurisdictional. Requirements making up a federal cause of action,
such as whether an entity meets the requisite definition of “employer”
set forth in Title VII, are not and cannot be purely jurisdictional. It
would eviscerate the right to a jury trial in such cases if a judge, by
stating that he or she is deciding a jurisdictional fact issue, decides
elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action and then dismisses the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, requirements
making up a federal cause of action go directly to the merits of the
plaintiff’s case; at the very least, they are intertwined with the merits
of the case.
The basis on which courts hold that such issues are purely
jurisdictional is unclear. Courts holding that such requirements are
purely jurisdictional issues for the court to decide cannot be relying
218
219
220
on § 1331 and the propositions set forth in Bell.
If Scarfo had

law,” before Title VII was amended to include a statutory right to a trial by jury, the
constitutional right to a jury trial did not apply to Title VII plaintiffs. See Curtis, 415
U.S. 189; Robinson, 444 F.2d 791; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Thus, courts were
not infringing upon a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial by deciding jurisdictional fact
issues.
216
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Title I, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2002)); see also supra note 194 and
accompanying text regarding the implication of a constitutional right to a jury trial
under Title VII.
217
See Scarfo, 175 F.3d 957.
218
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”).
219
See Bell, 327 U.S. 678. Under Bell, as long as the complaint seeks recovery
under a law of the United States or the Constitution, the federal court is obliged to
entertain the suit unless the claim is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction or . . . wholly insubstantial or frivolous.” Id. at 682-83. This
strict standard calls for a narrow approach to Rule 12(b)(1).
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been decided according to § 1331 and the logic of Bell, the federal
court would have first taken jurisdiction over the cause of action and
then looked at the merits to decide whether the defendant was an
221
“employer” under the statute.
It would not have dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).
If the court is not relying on § 1331 as the basis for subject
matter jurisdiction, the only other explanation is that it is relying
222
exclusively on a specialized grant of jurisdiction within Title VII.
This justification, however, is not convincing. The provision granting
jurisdiction to the federal district courts in Title VII is separate and
distinct from the provision setting forth the statutory requirements
relating to the number of employees required for an employer to be
223
In fact, the provision granting jurisdiction
subject to the statute.
does not even hint that the requirements set forth in earlier
provisions must be met before the federal district courts can claim
subject matter jurisdiction: “[e]ach United States district court and
each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
224
[title].”
The provision simply grants jurisdiction to the federal
225
district courts for any claim brought under Title VII.
Therefore,
even if the courts claimed they were relying on the specialized grant
of jurisdiction provided in Title VII to rationalize their finding that
whether a defendant is an “employer” is a jurisdictional fact, there is
226
nothing in the grant of jurisdiction to support such a holding.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected lower courts’ attempts to
read other procedural requirements of Title VII as jurisdictional,
requirements that arguably have a more plausible claim to be
227
jurisdictional than the definition of “employer.”
220

175 F.3d 957.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Bell, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (noting that as long as
the plaintiff’s claim is based upon a federal cause of action, the federal court must
assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits unless the claim is “immaterial
. . . or . . . wholly insubstantial or frivolous”).
222
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2001).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id.
227
See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982). In Zipes, the
Supreme Court held that “filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a
statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Id. at 393.
As noted by the Court, the provision granting the district courts jurisdiction under
Title VII “contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement.” Id. at 393-94.
“The provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an
221
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Even though Scarfo focused only on Title VII, the problems
associated with the application of the “intertwined with the merits”
228
exception are much broader.
By applying the logic of Scarfo,
federal courts have also wrongfully dismissed cases brought under the
229
FMLA and ADEA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As in the
cases involving Title VII, where the court decides elements of the
cause of action by calling the issues purely jurisdictional, the dismissal
of the plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(1) takes away the plaintiff’s
230
right to a trial by jury.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The real question is what makes a jurisdictional fact “intertwined
with the merits.” Perhaps the logical conclusion is to hold that for
231
any claim brought under § 1331, the jurisdictional issues are
necessarily intertwined with the merits of the case and so the court
must assume subject matter jurisdiction and then decide the case on
the merits. The only exceptions to this would be the two recognized
entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in
any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Id. at 394.
Similarly, Title VII’s jurisdictional grant is separate and distinct from the
definition section of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5[§ 706](f)(3) (2002). The
jurisdictional grant contains no reference to the definition of an “employer” under
the statute, nor does it contain a reference to any other term defined by Title VII. Id.
Applying the logic of Zipes, whether a defendant meets the statutory definition of an
“employer” under Title VII, or any other statutory definition, cannot be a
jurisdictional issue. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393-94.
228
As noted earlier, the logic in Scarfo can be, and has been, applied to cases
brought under a broad panoply of federal statutes. See supra Part II.C. Suits brought
under Title VII, as well as under the FMLA, ADEA, ADA, and EMTALA have all
required discussion on the application of the “intertwined with the merits”
exception.
229
29 U.S.C. § 630 (2001); 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2001). See, e.g., Hukill, 192 F.3d 437
(noting that the threshold number of employees necessary to satisfy the definition of
an employer under the FMLA is jurisdictional); Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 7
F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1993) (treating the “employer” requirement of the ADEA as an
element of subject matter jurisdiction).
230
Courts do not actually state that these issues are “purely jurisdictional”
although this is the logical effect of not treating them as intertwined with the merits
of the case. See supra Part II.C. If these issues were truly jurisdictional, a number of
things would follow: courts, including courts of appeals, would be obligated to raise
these issues sua sponte; parties—even a losing plaintiff—could raise these issues for
the first time on appeal; and, parties could not waive these issues by failing to raise
them, or by mere argument. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12-36. Additionally,
a “dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits,
and it therefore has no claim preclusive or res judicata effect.” Id. Finally, if these
issues were “purely jurisdictional” they would not apply in state court. See infra notes
235-39 and accompanying text.
231
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2001).
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by Bell v. Hood—essentially Rule 12(b)(1) could be used to dismiss
232
233
frivolous or pre-textual federal claims. In contrast, when § 1332 is
the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court may determine the
citizenship requirement as a pure jurisdictional fact.
This solution, however, is problematic. Dividing possible claims
into § 1331 and § 1332 categories ignores the possibility of cases
brought under statutes having their own specialized grant of
jurisdiction. Thus, the same issues would arise—whether any of the
statutory requirements are purely jurisdictional or intertwined with
the merits of the case—and the potential for inconsistencies would
still be great. In addition, courts normally do not decide the amount
in controversy requirement of § 1332 as a jurisdictional fact because it
is intertwined with the merits of the case; thus, the only way to see if
234
the amount is met is to try the claim.
A more effective approach would be to ask whether the
requirement in question would apply even if the action were filed in
state court. If the requirement still applies, then it cannot be a purely
jurisdictional requirement. If, however, the requirement does not
apply, then it can be treated as a purely jurisdictional fact to be
decided by the court. For example, regardless of where a plaintiff
235
files a Title VII claim, be it in state court or federal court, the
plaintiff has no claim unless she can establish that the defendant has
the requisite number of employees to bring it within the statutory
236
definition of “employer.”
In contrast, a plaintiff does not have to
prove that the defendants are diverse when filing in state court; it

232

See Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2001).
234
The amount claimed is “deemed to be made in good faith so long as it is not
clear to a legal certainty that the claimant could not recover a judgment exceeding
the jurisdictional amount.” 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 231; see also
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (stating that the
amount claimed by the plaintiff controls as long as it appears to have been made in
good faith; only if it can be determined to a legal certainty from the face of the
pleading that there can be no recovery of the jurisdictional amount will the plaintiff’s
claim be dismissed).
When the court decides the amount in controversy, it is inherently deciding the
amount of damages to be awarded. This is because to decide as fact what is in
controversy implicates both the substantive law of the claim and what is allowed in
terms of damages by that particular substantive law. Thus, the inquiries themselves
are linked and overlap in a manner sufficient to draw the analogy that the
determination of the amount in controversy requirement is intertwined with the
merits of the plaintiff’s case.
235
See Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (holding that
federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
236
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2001).
233
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must do so only when seeking to adjudicate state law claims in federal
237
court.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the authority of a federal
238
court to hear the action brought before it.
Therefore, in the
majority of cases involving Rule 12(b)(1) motions, it follows that a
state court should have jurisdiction over the action. For instance, in
Scarfo the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the statutory fifteen-employee
239
requirement was not met.
The determination of the court,
however, that Scarfo did not have a Title VII claim would have in
theory precluded her from succeeding in state court as well. Thus,
the fifteen-employee requirement is not a jurisdictional fact
pertaining to the jurisdiction of the federal court.
In determining whether a jurisdictional fact is “intertwined with
the merits” of the case, the best approach is to consider whether that
fact would have the same import in state as in federal court. If the
fact at issue is relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action only if the
plaintiff is in federal court, then the jurisdictional fact pertains to the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. In such a situation,
the application of Rule 12(b)(1) is proper. If, however, the fact at
issue is relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action in both federal and
state court, it is necessarily “intertwined with the merits” of the claim.
In such a case, the application of Rule 12(b)(1) is improper and
infringes upon a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the federal courts are inconsistently applying the
“intertwined with the merits” exception to Rule 12(b)(1). When
faced with a federal statute such as Title VII, which has its own
threshold requirements for applicability, federal courts are doing one
of two things. They are either holding that statutory requirements
are jurisdictional issues to be decided by the court, or that statutory
requirements are intertwined with the merits of the case, and as such
cannot be decided by the court. Consequently, this inconsistent
approach means that while some plaintiffs are given the opportunity
to exercise their right to a trial by jury, others are being deprived of
that same right.
The result in Scarfo and related cases compels the conclusion

237
238
239

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2001).
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, § 1350, at 194.
Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961.

1282

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:1247

that the federal courts must both re-visit and unify their approach to
Rule 12(b)(1) and the “intertwined with the merits” exception. As
the name suggests, a pure jurisdictional fact, which is determinative
of federal jurisdiction, should be relevant only in federal court. Until
the federal courts consistently apply this principle, the plaintiff’s right
to a jury trial is in serious jeopardy.

